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Abstract 
 
Social Protection is absent from the Millennium Development Goals (MDGs), and only 
recently has gained some prominence in the post-2015 discourse. In the past quarter century, 
however, rising inequality has often accompanied economic growth.  At the same time, the 
growing importance of risk and vulnerability on the wellbeing of the poor has been recognized. 
Further, there is now a consensus on adopting more ambitious goals on poverty reduction. 
Defining social protection as a collection of programs that address risk, vulnerability, inequality 
and poverty through a system of transfers in cash or in kind, this paper argues that social 
protection needs to be on the post-2015 agenda as a key element of the discourse.  It provides an 
empirical overview of social protection around the world based on the World Bank’s ASPIRE 
data set. Focusing on the goal of ending poverty, the paper estimates that social protection 
programs are currently preventing 150 million people from falling into poverty.  Based on the 
ASPIRE data set, this paper develops, tentatively and for discussion, a set of candidate goals, 
indicators and targets for the acceleration of poverty reduction through social protection.  We ask 
what it would take for social protection programs to contribute to halving the poverty gap in a 
country.  We show that if all countries could achieve the actual poverty reduction efficiency 
already observed in the top quartile of countries, then 70 percent of the countries in our sample 
could achieve this goal.  However, for 30 percent of the countries even reaching the top quartile 
on efficiency will not be enough—for these countries the issue is one of budgetary adequacy.  
  
                                                 
1 With contributions by Brooks Evans. Comments by Arup Banerji and Bénédicte de la Briere are gratefully 
acknowledged. The authors benefitted from the generous support of the Nordic Trust Fund through the project on 
“Strengthening the relevance of human rights in the Bank’s Human Development Work” and the Norwegian Trust 
Fund for Socially and Environmentally Sustainable Development. The authors are from the World Bank* and 
Cornell University**.  Corresponding author: Ravi Kanbur, sk145@cornell.edu. 
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1. Introduction 
 
 The Millennium Development Goals (MDGs) were formulated in the 1990s, using 1990 
as the base period to formulate goals and targets.  As such, they reflect a perspective on 
development which goes back 25 years.  Some elements of that perspective, for example the 
global concern with extreme poverty and hunger, have not changed and will continue to frame 
the post-2015 agenda.  The focus on education and health, which was itself new 25 years ago, 
will also remain central to the development discourse in the years to come.  However, the world 
today is different from that of 1990 in important respects, and development perspectives and 
challenges have evolved accordingly. 
 
Climate change and environmental damage have accelerated, and the need for global 
consensus on action is now much clearer.  Globalization and technological progress has brought 
historically high economic growth, but inequality has increased in many parts of the world, and 
countries that have bucked the inequality trend have only done so with pro-active policy effort. 
Macro-level vulnerabilities, as result of climate change and globalized trade and capital flows, 
have increased substantially.  At the same time, as a result of better data availability and 
research, there is a far greater appreciation in the development discourse of the importance of 
micro-level shocks and vulnerabilities faced by everybody, but particularly the less well off. 
 
The need to address extreme poverty, rising inequality, and risk and vulnerability, has led 
to an expansion of a set of instruments broadly classified under the heading of social protection. 
By social protection we mean a collection of programs that address risk, vulnerability, inequality 
and poverty through a system of transfers in cash or in kind.  The last decade has seen a dramatic 
expansion in the number of developing countries that have established relatively large cash 
transfer programs focused on low income and excluded groups in society (Hanlon, Barrientos 
and Hume, 2010).  For many countries expanded social protection programs are important 
enablers of progress in other key development goals:  conditional cash transfer programs have 
played a significant role in the achievement of the health and education MDGs; social safety nets 
have avoided negative impacts of crises on hunger and poverty2.  The growing evidence on 
impact of safety net programs (particularly strong in the case of CCTs as shown in Fiszbein and 
Schady, 2009) has facilitated their expansion including in low income countries.  Since 2009, 
under the threat of the food, fuel and financial crises, dozens of countries have created new social 
protection programs, expanded old ones, and improved administrative systems to modernize 
governance and make their programs more efficient (Fiszbein, Ringold and Srinivasan, 2011). 
 
Comparing 1990 with 2015, it is striking how the focus on social protection has changed, 
in reality and in the development discourse.  It was largely absent from the original MDG 
discourse, and from the MDGs themselves—as a goal, as a target, or as an indicator.  Today, it 
would be fair to say that social protection has stopped being a silent partner to development 
efforts.  However, less than half of the poor in the world have access to social protection.3  Social 
protection of any sort reaches less than a quarter of the poorest quintile of households in Africa.4  
While many middle-income countries have higher rates of coverage by social protection 
                                                 
2 See, for example, Berhane (2011) for an evaluation of the recent experience in Ethiopia. 
3 World Bank (2012). 
4 World Bank (2012). 
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programs, these often operate under less than optimal conditions (e.g. substantial financing 
shortfalls, poor targeting, sub-optimal impacts, coordination failures among multiple programs).5 
 
Unlike at the time of the original Millennium Declaration, today there is an unparalleled 
opportunity for the world community to prioritize the social protection agenda and, in doing so, 
bringing equity to the forefront of debates.  Currently, 80 percent of developing countries have 
plans to initiate or strengthen their social protection systems (World Bank, 2012).  This global 
interest is reflected in the UN Social Protection Floor initiative (ILO 2011) which calls on 
countries to establish or strengthen their existing social protection as an internationally 
recognized human right.   However, expansion of social protection particularly for the poorest 
and most vulnerable in society in a sustainable manner remains a challenge.  Complex issues are 
involved in defining the way programs can and should be designed, financed and implemented.  
The discussions on the post-2015 framework provide a unique opportunity to engage in a serious 
conversation on such issues.  Whether as a goal or as a critical instrument under-pinning many 
goals, social protection will need to be an integral part of the post-2015 framework. 
 
This paper is a contribution to the dialogue on the post-2015 development agenda, 
focusing on the role of social protection.  While acknowledging that social protection can play an 
important role in addressing a number of possible goals, we focus our attention on the goal of 
poverty eradication.  Section 2 of the paper sets out how the development landscape and 
discourse has changed since 1990, highlighting in particular poverty, inequality, risk and 
vulnerability and explores the role of social protection as an input, an output or an outcome of 
focus.  Section 3 then provides some basic facts about patterns of social protection in the world. 
Based on the previous discussion, Section 4 develops, in tentative fashion, some goals, targets 
and indicators for social protection as part of a post-2015 agenda.  Section 5 concludes. 
 
2. Social Protection and the Changing Development Landscape:  Poverty, Inequality 
and Vulnerability 
 
The first Millennium Development Goal (MDG1) is to Eradicate Extreme Poverty6.  The 
key associated target is to halve, between 1990 and 2015, the proportion of people in extreme 
poverty.  The indicators for this target are:  (a) Proportion of people below $1.25 (PPP) per day, 
(b) Poverty gap ratio (characterizing the depth of poverty at $1.25/day) and (c) Share of the 
poorest quintile in national consumption.  The indicators thus recognize that within the context 
of robust economic growth, mitigating inequality is also an important aspect of achieving the 
goal of sharply reducing poverty.  
 
The post-2015 discussion is just getting started, and it is too early to know what its full 
shape will be.  However, it would be very surprising if something like the current MDG1, 
eradication of Extreme Poverty, will not be part of the structure of goals—it may even remain 
broadly unchanged.  Of course, the poverty picture globally has changed, so the targets may 
change.  In particular, the target of halving the proportion of people whose income is less than 
                                                 
5 World Bank (2012). 
6 The full set of MDG goals, targets and indicators is reproduced in Annex 7 for easy reference. 
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one dollar a day has already been met at the global level, although not of course everywhere in 
the world, especially not in Africa and in fragile states.  This evolution of the development 
landscape could lead to the adoption of a much more ambitious target for poverty reduction at 
the global and national levels.  The World Bank, for example, is considering adoption of a target 
of reducing the proportion of people living below the “dollar-a-day” line7 to zero or close to 
zero, and something like this target may well emerge in the post-2015 agenda.8  Further, the 
global community may set itself a more ambitious agenda on time, to “bend the arc of poverty”9 
and eliminate it much faster than a quarter century time horizon. 
 
There are, however, two features of the situation in 2015, compared to that in 1990, 
which require going beyond the simple target focused on the percentage or population below the 
dollar-a-day line.  First is the evolution of inequality, and second is the growing recognition of 
the importance of vulnerability of the poor to a range of risks and shocks.  Let us take each of 
these in turn. 
 
From the perspective of 1990, the development experience of the 25 years previous to 
then was dominated by the “growth with equity” miracle of the East Asian economies.  These 
economies had managed to achieve growth with falling inequality, which paid a double divided 
for poverty reduction.10  There was considerable discussion and indeed controversy on how they 
did this, and on the lessons for development policy.  This is not the place to revisit that debate 
and in any event the experience post 1990 has been quite different.  The dominant experience of 
the last 25 years has been the spectacular growth experience by China since the 1980s and by 
India since the 1990s.  However, this growth has been accompanied by sharp rises in inequality. 
Indeed, in the last 25 years, concerns have grown about increasing income inequality within 
countries in the world.  Even in the East Asian “miracle” economies, inequality has increased.  In 
developing Asia as a whole, more than 80 percent of the population lives in countries where 
inequality has increased since the 1990s.11  This trend has been bucked by Latin American 
economies from 2000 onwards, but it is recognized that this has happened only because of 
concerted policy effort in these countries, which include significant social protection oriented 
policy interventions.12 
 
An analysis of global trends reveals fundamental economic forces, which are tending to 
push inequality upwards.  An opening up to global trade and to market forces generally initially 
benefits those best prepared to take these opportunities—those with more capital, better skills, 
and better geographical location such as coastal regions.  Alongside these market forces, the 
forces of technological change are leading to more capital intensive and skills intensive 
production, and to rising skill premia, both of which push for greater inequality given the 
unequal distribution of wealth and of human capital.  There is debate as to which of the two, 
technology or trade, is the dominant explanation, but that both are important is now accepted.13  
                                                 
7 Although “dollar a day” is the expression used commonly, the actual line is $1.25 per day in Purchasing Power 
Parity (PPP). 
8 See World Bank (2013). 
9 These are the words of World Bank President Jim Yong Kim. 
10 World Bank (1993), Adelman and Robinson (1978). 
11 Asian Development Bank (2012). 
12 Lustig, Lopez-Calva and Eduardo Ortiz-Juarez (2011). 
13 This large literature is reviewed in Asian Development Bank (2012). 
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It is unlikely that these fundamental forces of technology and markets will reverse in the coming 
25 years.  Thus, without proactive policy, there will be a strong tendency for inequality to 
increase and for the goal of eradicating poverty to move further away. 
 
Inequality is a key aspect of social wellbeing and may well deserve a place alongside 
poverty as a key dimension of the post-2015 framework of goals and targets.  However, 
inequality is also detrimental to the achievement of the poverty reduction goal since it can 
dissipate the impact of economic growth on poverty reduction.  For example, calculations for 
Asia show that if inequality had not risen, then economic growth could have lifted almost a 
quarter of a billion more people out of poverty over the last two decades.14  Similarly, for Brazil 
between 1998 and 2009, had inequality not declined to the extent it did, annual growth would 
have had to have been 4 percentage points higher to achieve the same poverty reduction over this 
period.15  Thus measures to mitigate inequality will be important in the post-2015 agenda. 
 
Consider now a second feature of development reality and development discourse of the 
past quarter century--the central role that risk and vulnerability plays in the lives of the poorest of 
the poor.  These vulnerabilities, of ill health for example, were always present, but research and 
analysis has helped to illuminate their extent, magnitude and nature16.  Further, there is also 
evidence that these vulnerabilities have grown, as reflected in climate change driven natural 
disasters, infectious diseases, financial crises and other risks of globalization.17  The risks impact 
the MDGs and the post-2015 discourse in two ways: 
 
 Firstly, the risks faced by the poor and their impact on wellbeing and peace of mind 
are not fully captured in standard poverty measures.  Qualitative research brings this 
out strongly in the “Voices of the Poor.”18  In quantitative terms, the costs of this risk 
are like having an even lower income, for the poor.  Further, if this adjustment is 
made for risk and vulnerability, many of those currently above the poverty line will 
have equivalent incomes below the poverty line, so that standard approaches may 
understate actual poverty.19 
 
 Secondly, shocks and risks can have a medium term effect on household productivity. 
For example, the effects of a shortfall in nutrition on body development for babies 
during difficult times, is not compensated fully by an equal and opposite 
improvement in nutrition in good times.20  When faced with these risks poor 
households do adopt strategies which can reduce (but not eliminate) risk in the short 
                                                 
14Asian Development Outlook (2012). 
15 Lustig, Ortiz-Juarez and Lopez-Calva (2011). 
16 There is a huge literature, of course.  See, for example, Dercon (2004), Chronic Poverty Research Centre (2009), 
and the special issue of the Journal of Development Studies in 2009, including papers by Menon (2009), Bene 
(2009) and Heltburg and Lund (2009). 
17 See, for example, Di Giovanni and Levchenko (2008) and Kose, Prasad and Terrones (2005). 
18 Narayan (2000). 
19 There is a large literature on measurement of poverty in the context of risk and vulnerability.  For recent papers 
see Ligon and Schecter (2002), DuclosArrar and Giles (2010), and the papers in Addison, Hulme and Kanbur 
(2009). 
20Hoddinott and Kinsey (2001), Tiwari, Jacoby and Skoufias (2013). 
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term.  However, these very same strategies have long term deleterious consequences 
on their income, thus keeping them in a poverty trap.  For example, they can hold 
back from adopting higher yielding but riskier crop varieties, or investment in human 
capital.21 
 
Given the objective of rapid reduction of poverty, the prospect of rising inequality, and 
the importance of addressing risk and vulnerability, the logic of modifying and strengthening the 
discourse on MDG1 has strong validity: 
 
 First, reducing poverty from its 1990 level to half that level is a different proposition 
from essentially eliminating it starting from its current level.  This will prove a more 
challenging exercise simply because we are getting to the part of the distribution 
which is harder to reach.  
 Secondly, if we want to achieve elimination of poverty on a more ambitious time 
table than the quarter century to halve it from its 1990 level, to “bend the arc of 
poverty,” this will in turn add to the challenges and require some pro-active policies 
towards the poorest. 
 Thirdly, given the fundamentally dis-equalizing pressures in the global economy due 
to technology and more open flows goods and capital, additional policy effort will be 
needed to achieve the goal of ending extreme poverty. 
 Fourthly and finally, the effects of risk and vulnerability on the short term and 
medium term wellbeing of the poorest individuals and their children will have to be 
addressed. 
When faced with the need to help poor households address and cope with the risks and 
volatility they face, and with the objective of achieving a more rapid, a more extensive, and a 
deeper reduction in income poverty and destitution than can be achieved at current growth rates, 
governments can use a range of interventions broadly described as “social protection.”  Some of 
these are focused on risk, like various insurance programs; others are focused on poverty, like 
conditional cash transfers; but many if not most programs can and do address both goals (for 
example, public works schemes).  Their effects on poverty (and wellbeing) are both direct and 
indirect, creating the conditions for higher productivity and risk management. 
 
When social protection programs work well, as a collectivity, they contribute to the 
achievement of a modified and extended MDG1—modified to incorporate a more ambitious time 
frame of poverty reduction in the context of rising inequality, and extended to incorporate the 
short term and long term consequences of income risk. 
 
We believe, therefore, that social protection has a central role to play in the post-2015 
development agenda.  Specifically, we propose social protection as an instrument for the goals of 
reducing poverty, reducing inequality, and reducing risk and vulnerability.22  Whether the 
                                                 
21 See for example Jacoby and Skoufias (1997) and papers in Dercon (2004) and Addison, Hulme and Kanbur 
(2009). 
22 It should be clear that even though elements of the MDG are independent goals of development in their own 
right, they are also interdependent in that the achievement of one goal can facilitate the achievement of another.  The 
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inequality and vulnerability goals end up as separate goals in their own right, or are treated as 
sub-goals under the broad heading of reducing poverty, social protection comes in as a key 
instrument to achieve these goals.  What we need, then, are indicators to help policy makers 
judge the extent of social protection, and how well it is doing as an instrument for achieving the 
goals.  The next sections will take up this task by focusing on what is the most agreed upon goal 
under the MDG framework: the reduction of extreme poverty.  
 
It should be noted that the MDG discourse itself is somewhat eclectic about final 
outcomes and instruments to achieve those outcomes.  For example, take MDG4, reducing child 
mortality.  The target is to reduce by two thirds, between 1990 and 2015, the under-five mortality 
rate.  The three indicators for this target include “proportion of 1 year-old children immunized 
against measles.”  Clearly, this is an instrument for the target and the goal, not an indicator for 
the goal and target.  Or consider as a second example MDG5, improving maternal health.  The 
indicators for this include on the one hand the maternal mortality ratio, which is clearly an 
indicator for the goal, and on the other hand “proportion of births attended by skilled health 
personnel”, which is equally clearly an instrument for achieving the goal. 
 
There is another use for development goals beyond an expression of consensus on the 
objectives of development and the related question of the instruments to achieve these goals. 
This is the use of goal setting per se as an aid to development, through mobilizing political 
consensus, the energies of civil society, and appropriate volumes and types of development 
assistance.  A set of international goals can act as a standard setting device at the national level, 
energizing domestic civil society to hold their government to an international standard to which 
the government has signed up.  Thus the goals, targets and indicators can be used as devices for 
assessing performance of governments relative to international standards, which have possibly 
been tailored to local conditions.  Finally, the standards can also, if quantified, be used to 
develop estimates of resources needed to achieve the goals and targets, although here there will 
need to be a clearer articulation of the causal links between instruments (which may be present in 
the discourse as indicators) and the goals and targets. 
 
For the task of mobilizing civil society’s and the polity’s energies towards the 
development goals, targets and indicators, these will have to be developed and stated in a form 
that appeals to a wide audience.23  There may be a tradeoff between targets and indicators that 
meet a high theoretical or conceptual standard, and between those that can appeal to a broad 
audience and can thus be the basis for mobilization.  In what follows we will try to develop a set 
of indicators and targets for social protection as an instrument of poverty reduction which have 
general appeal but also correspond as closely as possible to rigorous conceptual foundations. 
 
                                                                                                                                                             
interrelationships between education and income are well understood by now, so MDG 1 and MDG2 are clearly 
interrelated.  The, links between mother’s education and child health are also well established, so MDG3 and MDG 
4 are interrelated. There is now significant evidence that inequality is detrimental to growth (See Kanbur and Lustig 
(1999) and Berg and Ostry (2011)).  Thus reducing inequality as a direct goal is related in turn to the direct goal of 
reducing income poverty as in MDG1.  And the micro level links between risk aversion and turning away from high 
return/ high risk activities like adoption of new crop varieties has already been discussed.  To the extent that 
investment in education, especially of girls, is perceived by households as a risky proposition, risk and vulnerability 
also works against the achievement of MDG 2 and MDG 3. 
23 Gauri (2012). 
 12 
 
3. Social Protection and Poverty Reduction Around the World24 
Having argued that eliminating poverty, and addressing rising inequality and 
vulnerability will need to be a major part of the post-2015 development agenda, and that social 
protection is a key instrument to address these challenges; this section will set out the basic facts 
of social protection around the world.  In particular, we will present quantitative estimates for the 
impact of social protection programs on poverty and inequality, which in turn depends on their 
efficiency and the adequacy of resources devoted to them.  This factual account will then form 
the foundation for the next section, which presents potential international standards and targets 
for social protection as an instrument for achieving poverty reduction. 
  
We acknowledge upfront that poverty reduction is not the sole objective of social 
protection programs.  However, in the context of the post-2015 agenda we prefer to retain the 
focus on a single goal (poverty reduction) to assess social protection programs.  We focus the 
presentation on the first set of current MDG1 goals formulated in terms of poverty at the 
international “dollar a day” line (more exactly $1.25 per day per capita in 2005 PPP).  The 
purpose of this is to show that the proposed recast of goals can be operationalized with the data 
at hand.  But as most readers would know, a poverty line is in many ways an arbitrary cut off. 
For many (richer) countries the dollar a day line does not represent a meaningful standard.  We 
thus also use a relative cut off, set at the upper boundary of the bottom quintile of consumption 
(so that poverty headcount is fixed at 20 percent in any country).  And alongside impacts on 
these poverty measures we also look at the impacts of social protection on inequality.  In order 
not to divert the attention from the primary focus on extreme poverty and the potential for its 
elimination, we reduce discussion of other measures to a minimum; the interested reader can find 
corresponding data in the annexes.  We return to the broader set of measures for social protection 
when we discuss policy implications in the conclusion to this paper.  
 
There are different types of social protection programs depending on their objectives and 
the risks they cover.  Classifications abound, and we follow the most widespread typology that is 
accepted for the developing world.25  In what follows we include as social protection programs 
for social insurance (contributory programs, principally pensions), labor markets (for example 
job training), and non-contributory social assistance programs (or social safety nets) which 
include humanitarian and disaster relief programs, cash transfers, food stamps, school feeding, 
in-kind transfers, labor-intensive public works, targeted food assistance, subsidies and fee 
waivers.  Social insurance and labor market programs tend to benefit higher income groups, 
whereas social assistance programs generally (but not exclusively) focus on the most poor and 
vulnerable.  
 
The objectives of these various social protection programs and their scale vary from 
country to country.  Run by governments, NGOs or donors, these programs are typically 
designed to protect vulnerable households and individuals, help the poor and promote 
employment, while increasing social cohesion and reducing inequality.  Social protection 
programs address different needs of different groups; hence it is no surprise that many countries 
                                                 
24 This section draws on a longer forthcoming paper, Fiszbein, Kanbur and Yemtsov (2013). 
25 See, for example, the World Bank’s new Social Protection and Labor Strategy, World Bank (2012b). 
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adopt different forms of social protection, but some components are almost universally accepted 
as part of the social protection architecture.   
 
For example, by the year 2013 cash transfers are used in practically all developed, 
developing and emerging countries around the world and close to 1 billion people are covered by 
this type of protection.26  School feeding programs, recently reviewed by the World Food 
Program and the World Bank, exist in 78 developing countries in the world and cover 270 
million children.27  Public works at scale exist in over 50 countries.  
 
But how do these programs compare to the size of population?  Data from household 
surveys assembled by the World Bank in the resource called ASPIRE give a sense of coverage 
across countries. 28  Based on responses from households in nationally representative surveys, 
one can estimate what percent of a population is covered by different forms of social protection 
programs by regions (Figure 1).  We see that globally even though all developing countries seem 
to have some form of social protection, less than one half of the population benefits from it.  
Social protection of any sort reaches less than a quarter of the population in Sub-Africa.  Despite 
South Asia’s longer history of locally owned safety net programs, just over one third of 
population (and slightly more- 40 percent of the poorest quintile as shown in Annex 3) is reached 
by any sort of social protection.  Many countries have incomplete social protection systems with 
important instruments missing.  But in some countries, such as Romania, Mongolia, Chile or 
Thailand, social protection covers close to 100 percent of their poorest and most of the 
population (see Annex 3). 
 
 
  
                                                 
26 Barrientos (2012). Discussing the choice of specific instruments and their relative role in each country is beyond 
the scope of this paper; see World Bank (2012b). 
27 World Food Program school feeding global survey 2012. 
28To look at the coverage by a whole set of social protection programs, their adequacy, and impacts on poverty and 
inequality, one needs household survey data that provides information on the poverty status of beneficiaries, as well 
as on the transfers from a variety of social protection programs.  We rely on the World Bank’s ASPIRE data set. It is 
based on household surveys that are relatively recent (after 2005), contain social protection questions or modules 
which allow the identification of beneficiaries of social programs, and are harmonized, and are available to the 
World Bank ( www.worldbank.org/spatlas).  Among all countries in the developing world as of 2013 only 56 meet 
these criteria.  The data includes 17 countries in Low-Income Groups, 20 in Lower middle-income and 15 in upper 
middle income (classification is from WB Atlas).  In terms of regional break down 7 counties are in Sub-Saharan 
Africa (AFR), 8 in East Asia & Pacific (EAP), 17 in Eastern and Central Europe (ECA), 16 in Latin America and 
the Caribbean (LAC), 3 in the Middle East and northern Africa (MNA), and 7 in South Asia (SAR).  The ASPIRE 
data set is expanding rapidly- this year 10 more countries will be added and another 15 are in the pipeline.  See 
Annex 2 for list of countries and surveys used.    
 14 
 
Figure 1:  Percent Covered by Main Types Social Protection Programs by Regions 
 
 (Percent of population receiving transfers from social protection program) 
 
 
 
Source: World Bank SP Atlas of Social Protection (ASPIRE) – see Annex Table 3 for countries used for the 
calculations; country populations used as weights to expand to regions’ average 
 
How adequate are social protection transfers?  Do they provide sufficient resources to the 
recipients to alleviate their poverty and avoid detrimental coping strategies?  ASPIRE data can 
be used to compare average transfers received with the average consumption of its beneficiaries.  
Here also the variation across countries is large (Annex 3).  Countries in Eastern Europe and 
Central Asia tend to provide generous support averaging 53 percent (that is, programs cover over 
one half of the consumption of people who receive it), while countries in Latin America seem to 
be calibrating their benefit systems to the scale of poverty gap and transfer on average 27 percent 
to the income of beneficiaries (the average poor person in these countries is about 25 percent 
below the poverty line).  In Africa and developing Asia extreme values can be found, but for 
most countries with nascent systems it is very low.  The lowest adequacy (less than 10 percent) 
regionally is South Asia and the Middle East and Northern Africa.   
 
To sum up, most countries in the world use multiple social protection instruments, but 
their simple presence is not yet a sign of their effectiveness.  The scale and coverage of social 
protection differ a great deal across countries.  Hence their real impact on poverty and inequality 
is also likely to vary a lot.   
 
3.1 Poverty impact of social protection programs 
 
How can the impact of social protection on poverty and inequality be estimated?  As 
argued earlier, social protection affects well-being through three channels of impact:  first, direct 
reduction of income poverty through transfer of purchasing power to the beneficiaries, but also 
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two other less direct channels, namely insurance/protection against risk or shocks (where the 
longer-term poverty consequences of a shock often decrease the "lifetime" poverty of the 
beneficiaries allowing them to recover better from these shocks); and “investment income” as 
additional returns or income from productive investment, and employment generated through the 
participation in social protection programs.  Obviously, these three channels are co-existent, and 
any social protection program has effects on poverty and inequality along all three channels.  For 
example, income security due to the receipt of regular transfers encourages beneficiaries to 
invest in higher risk but also higher return activities, or overcome market failures allowing them 
to invest in their human capital.  There is mounting empirical evidence on the precise magnitude 
of such indirect impacts for the long-term income growth of the beneficiaries (reviewed in 
Alderman and Yemtsov 2013).  However, all of these studies typically cover the effect of one 
program in one country, and it is hard to generalize across the world.    
 
To approach the issue of cross-country comparability and comprehensiveness, we limit 
our attention to just the first, direct, channel of transfer impact on the current wellbeing of 
beneficiaries.  For this we use household survey information and compute what the household’s 
income would be without the transfers it receives from social protection programs.  Thus, 
generally the transfer value is subtracted from individual or household welfare29, providing a 
synthetic counterfactual.  Of course these results are more indicative than authoritative since 
behavioral effects, for example, are not simulated.30  In the short run, if households reduced their 
efforts to earn market income in response to income transfers through social protection, then this 
method would give an overestimate of the impact on poverty.  Evidently any medium term 
improvements in household market income discussed above imply that the direct assessment 
would be an underestimate of the poverty and inequality impact.  It is difficult to know where 
exactly the balance would come out, but our estimates can provide an anchor for discussion and 
sensitivity analysis. 
 
Using the ASPIRE dataset and an international poverty line of $1.25 per day per capita in 
PPP, Figure 2 below uses this simulation to estimate how many people are moved out of poverty 
as a result of social protection transfers (by income groups of countries) in the ASPIRE surveys.  
If these estimation from surveys in ASPIRE are extrapolated to the world population in 
developing and emerging countries,  almost 150 million people worldwide are prevented from 
falling into extreme poverty thanks to social protection. 31  This is a sizeable dent in global 
poverty which counts 1.4 billion people (at $1.25 a day).  Taking the pre-transfer poverty 
headcount as the base, the average reduction in poverty across developing countries is about 45 
                                                 
29 Welfare is a measure of well-being, and is defined either as per capita income or consumption. 
30 For example, it is assumed that if a person stops receiving a pension, he or she will try to survive on the remaining 
income after the pension is taken away.  In practice that person can seek assistance from relatives and community 
that will partly compensate this loss of income, so will not be as poor as assuming no replacement.  
31 This is based on assumption that 56 countries in ASPIRE are broadly representative of their regional peers 
currently not in the ASPIRE data set.  If there is some correlation between the presence of data on social protection 
and real effort in providing social transfers, then extrapolating from surveys to countries without surveys will 
provide an overestimate of the number of people affected by social protection in the world.  At the same time, since 
most surveys do not entirely capture all social protection programs in countries (for reasons of data collection costs), 
the ASPIRE itself may be underestimating the poverty impact of social protection in countries it covers.  Thus there 
are forces pulling in opposite directions which tend to cancel each other out, giving us some confidence at least for 
the range of estimates we produce, but it is difficult to know the net effect precisely. 
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percent.  This impressive global impact differs across countries:  it is largest in Eastern Europe 
and Central Asia and smallest in Sub-Saharan Africa, where only 1 percent of the population 
moves out of poverty thanks to social protection transfers.     
 
Figure 2: Poverty Headcount Reduction by Social Protection, by Region and Income Level 
(at $1.25/Day/Person) 
 
 
SSA: Sub-Saharan Africa, MNA: Middle East and North Africa, SAR- South Asia, EAP- East Asia and Pacific, LAC- Latin America and 
Caribbean, ECA- Eastern Europe and Central Asia  
 
Source: Authors based on ASPIRE, see Annex  
 
Turning now to differences across countries we see quite a large spread in terms of 
poverty reduction, even across countries belonging to the same income group or the same region: 
dollar a day poverty is reduced by 100 percent (it is eliminated) in several upper middle income 
countries in ECA (such as Romania or Poland), and in some low income country like Mongolia 
in EAP (see Annex 4).  Figure 3 shows that typically it is in the poorest countries that the impact 
of social protection on poverty is the smallest, and arguably this is where it is needed the most.  
But at the same time countries that are close in poverty incidence achieve very different results in 
terms of poverty reduction:  Georgia and Bolivia and next to each other on the graph, but without 
social protection Georgia would have a much higher poverty rate.    
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Figure 3: Graph of Poverty (Post-Transfer) and Poverty Headcount Reduction by Social 
Protection 
 
 
Source: Authors based on ASPIRE, See Annex  
 
There are several countries where absolute poverty measured by $1.25 a day standard is 
low or even zero, and hence the impact of social protection cannot be assessed.  For this reason, 
the annexes give estimates of poverty impact not only for $1.25/day line, but also for a relative 
line with a cutoff of the bottom quintile.  
 
The poverty headcount, while informative about the scale of poverty, does not 
characterize the nature of poverty:  how deep and severe it might be, how far an average poor 
person is from the poverty line.  The most intuitive measure for this is the total poverty gap- or 
the sum of the gaps between income and the poverty line for the poor in country.32  Using again 
the international poverty line of $1.25 and a simulation of social protection impacts we can see in 
Figure 4 that the impact of social transfers on this poverty measure is even greater than what we 
saw for the headcount (on average almost half of the poverty gap is eliminated).  Once more 
countries differ a lot in how successfully they are closing the poverty gap.  Some are eliminating 
it completely; some are making hardly a visible difference. 
                                                 
32 Note that this is simply the FGT1 measure of poverty multiplied by the poverty line and the total population in the 
country—see Annex 1. 
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Figure 4: Graph of Poverty Gap Reduction by Social Protection (% of Pre-Transfer 
Poverty Gap Filled, at $1.25/Day)  
 
 
Source:  Authors based on ASPIRE, see Annex  
 
The reduction of inequality as measured by the Gini index is also quite dramatic (Annex 
4), even though properties of this measure of inequality mean that impacts will tend to be 
smaller:  on average the Gini index is reduced by 10 percent by social protection programs, led 
by ECA averaging over 30 percent, while the other regions all experience a reduction of less than 
5 percent in the Gini.  Figure 5 shows a close relationship between the scale of inequality 
reduction and the poverty gap reduction by social protection programs, even though the 
relationship is not one-to one (in some countries inequality is even increasing as a result of social 
protection transfers- something impossible with our definition of poverty measures).  Note that 
for several countries the standard of $1.25/day as a poverty line means the complete elimination 
of poverty, while they achieve very different results in terms of inequality reduction (top of the 
right panel).  Using relative cut-off (left panel) gives a closer relationship, and again shows much 
stronger effects on poverty than on inequality.  In what follows we will focus on the poverty 
impact at the absolute $1.25/day line as the most direct and visible measure for social 
protection’s contribution to eliminating extreme poverty.       
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Figure 5:  Gini Index Reduction vs. Poverty Gap Reduction 
  
With poverty line as cut off for bottom Quintile   With Poverty defined at $1.25/day 
  
 
Source:  Authors based on ASPIRE, see Annex  
 
3.2   Decomposing the Poverty Impact: Poverty Reduction Efficiency and Budgetary 
Adequacy 
 
We have shown that social protection programs can have a significant impact on poverty. 
But there is considerable variation in poverty reduction performance of social protection 
programs across countries.  What does this depend on?  Intuitively, the impact will depend on 
two things—total funds available for transfers to the poor, and how well they are used.  The 
decomposition can be represented clearly in the case where poverty is measured by the sum of 
the shortfalls of poor peoples’ income from the poverty line, the poverty gap or PGAP (see 
Annex 1 for further explanation).  The reduction in this poverty gap as a result of social 
protection programs, PGAP, is then simply the total amount of transfers that go the poor, Tp. 
Denoting all transfers to poor and non-poor as the transfer budget B, we can write the following: 
 
(PGAP/PGAP) =  (Tp/B)/(B/PGAP) 
 
In the above expression, the left hand side is the percentage reduction in the poverty gap.  The 
first term on the right hand side is the ratio of transfers that go to the poor as fraction of all 
transfers (i.e. to both the poor and non-poor).  This is a measure of the poverty reduction 
efficiency, also called the targeting efficiency, of the programs as a whole.  It is also referred as 
the “benefit-cost ratio” (BCR), as it shows for each dollar of transfers (or “costs”) what share 
goes to fill the poverty gap (“benefit”), and only poverty gap.33  The BCR can take values from 
zero (the poor receive nothing) to one (all of the transfers are going to the poor and only to fill 
the poverty gap).  The second term on the right hand side is the total transfers as compared to the 
full pre social protection transfer poverty gap.  If this “budget ratio” is less than one, then even 
with perfect targeting the poverty gap cannot be filled.  Evidently, the budget ratio can also have 
                                                 
33 This measure obviously ignores administrative costs to run the program or any leakages or losses that occur 
before the program reaches to beneficiaries.  It takes therefore “an ideal” view of the systems performance.  Such 
administrative data are not easily available across a wide range of countries and programs.  
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a value greater than one.  The expression synthesizes the twin requirements for social protection 
to have an impact on poverty—adequate budget, and good targeting.34 
 
 Annex 5 shows the percentage reduction in poverty gap, and its constituent parts in terms 
of poverty reduction efficiency and budgetary adequacy. 
 
The adequacy of the social protection budgets varies extremely widely across countries. 
On average, countries’ total transfer flows to beneficiaries from social protection amount to 26 
times the poverty gap (as measured by international extreme poverty line of $1.25/day).  Thus, 
on average the support provided is well above what it takes to eliminate absolute poverty if 
poverty focus were perfect, or even sufficiently good.  That of course is a reflection of the fact 
that for many countries the poverty line of $1.25 is a very low standard and represents a 
negligible fraction of GDP.  But even for these countries, it is important to ascertain that the very 
poor are at least being helped.  The median SP system is providing transfers 12 times the poverty 
gap.  If properly targeted, benefits could lift the average poor out of poverty or at least bring her 
much closer to the poverty line, thereby reducing the poverty gap or even eliminating it 
completely.  
 
Achieving such impacts depend not only on the adequacy of transfers, but also on how 
well the system is focused towards the poor.  It is of course unrealistic to expect that the benefit-
cost ratio for social protection will be anywhere near to 1.  First, no real program is attempting to 
exactly close the poverty gap and just that.  Transferring different amounts to beneficiaries 
depending on how close they are to the poverty line would mean giving different amounts to 
different poor people, which proves at times to be politically infeasible and administratively 
costly.  Second, the objectives of the social protection programs may go beyond immediate 
consumption and short-term poverty eradication.  Many elements of social protection are indeed 
not intended to be targeted to the actual poor, but to protect non-poor against the risk of 
becoming poor, or help the vulnerable to improve their resilience (e.g. contributory pensions, 
unemployment benefits, universal health insurance etc.).  In the developing world represented by 
56 countries in ASPIRE, only 23.6 percent of all social protection beneficiaries are present 
among the poorest quintile.  
 
Nevertheless, important criterion for assessing the adequacy of any social protection 
program is its ability to alleviate poverty and ensure equity (see for instance Grosh et al’s (2008) 
discussion of targeting efficiency).  That is, while a BCR of 1 is an unattainable ideal 
benchmark, countries may ensure adequate protection of the poor and vulnerable by ensuring 
that at least some resources flow to the poor.  And indeed, on average the BCR for the SP system 
as a whole is above zero, with a maximum value of 0.4 (the higher levels are achieved by 
countries as diverse as Timor-Leste, West Bank and Gaza and Rwanda) – meaning that for each 
dollar of transfer at least 40 cents is going to fill the poverty gap.   
 
Even programs that are not specifically focused on the poor can achieve good 
performance in targeting the lower end of the income distribution.  We examine this through 
ASPIRE, focusing on how well different types of programs reach the poorest quintile.  Figure 6 
shows the BCR varies across types of programs.  With a mix of social protection programs some 
                                                 
34 The Annex 1 shows the formulae in full technical detail. 
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countries are achieving relatively high degrees of efficiency for some programs- the BCR is 
above 0.5 in almost 40 programs across countries. 
 
Figure 6:  Graph of Benefit-Cost Ratio for Different Types of Social Protection Programs  
 
 
 
 
Source:  Authors calculations. Note: BCR for poverty line set at the lowest quintile cut-off. Benefit-cost ratio is the reduction in poverty gap 
obtained for each $1 spent in Social Protection and Labor programs.  
 
Figure 6 also shows that there is no specific association between program type and its 
efficiency in targeting the poor. The distribution of BCRs across social pensions, other cash 
transfers and in-kind programs is similar.  CCTs tend to have higher efficiency in terms of filling 
poverty gaps, while “other” programs (typically subsidies or social services) tend to be less 
efficient.  This comparison suggests that countries have a lot of space for increasing the poverty 
focus to achieve greater poverty reduction by changing the mix of programs they already have or 
by improving the targeting of their programs in line with better practice. 
 
The decomposition of poverty impact into budgetary adequacy and targeting efficiency 
shows that adequacy and efficiency often move in opposite directions.  Many countries have 
more than adequate budgets, but their efficiency is reduced by a very low BCR.  Figure 7 
summarizes this relationship using the $1.25 poverty line.  The figure suggests there is potential 
to increase the impact on poverty.  On the one hand, some countries with high adequacy can 
increase efficiency, possibly through reallocation from less efficient programs.  On the other 
hand countries with high efficiency can achieve greater impacts by expanding their programs and 
increasing adequacy.  For countries with similar budget adequacy the BCR takes very different 
values:  Vietnam achieves 4 time greater efficiency (BCR) than Guatemala with a comparable 
budget ratio.  This suggests the BCR has considerable scope to improve the performance of the 
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social protection systems in terms of their impacts on poverty and equity at every level of the 
spending.  At the same time, countries at moderate levels of efficiency can also have very 
different degree of budgetary adequacy, leading to different performance on poverty reduction. 
The next section considers the impact on poverty reduction of improving efficiency at given 
levels of budget, and budgetary requirements for poverty reduction even at high levels of 
efficiency.  This leads to consideration of where to set potential targets for social protection. 
 
Figure 7:  Benefit-Cost Ratio and Budget Ratio (normalized) 
  
 
  
Source: Annex 6: Poverty Gap Changes with Differing Efficiency Scenarios, Low Income Countries (LIC). Maximum 
value of BCR of 0,4 and maximum value of budget adequacy of 186 are  taken as 1 for comparison across countries. 
4. Social Protection Targets for Poverty Reduction 
 
The previous section has shown that social protection can have a major impact on 
poverty.  Under certain assumptions, social protection can be argued to have prevented more 
than 150 million people from falling into poverty in 2010.  There is, however, large variation 
across countries and programs in how much poverty reduction is accomplished.  By looking at 
this variation, and in particular focusing on global best practice, this section suggests, in tentative 
fashion, some guidelines and perhaps targets for social protection programs within the post-2015 
framework.  These targets are based on the empirical assessment of performance of social 
protection programs in reducing poverty and simulations of how the poverty gap could be 
reduced further under greater levels of efficiency of existing expenditures.  We will show that 
while in many countries increasing efficiency to global best practice levels is sufficient to 
achieve poverty reduction goals, in many other low and lower middle income countries 
additional expenditure will be needed.  Greater efficiency can be achieved at the level of 
individual programs, as well as through reallocations from less to more efficient social protection 
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programs.  However, when those alternatives are not sufficient, the mobilization of additional 
resources will be needed to increase the budget envelope for social protection. 
 
While social protection can clearly be a contributor to poverty reduction, it cannot be the 
whole story.  Rising incomes of the poor, through rising productivity and economic growth, have 
to play their role. In this section we explore the implications of asking that social protection 
contribute a certain share of poverty reduction.  Specifically, we will analyze the implications of 
what is needed for social protection to reduce the poverty gap by a half, leaving the other half to 
be filled by rising incomes associated with economic growth. 
 
Figure 4 in the previous section and Annex 5 present the percentage reduction of the 
poverty gap accounted for by social protection transfers for 47 countries for which have data, 
ranked from lowest to highest.  The mean reduction is 45 percent and the median is 38 percent. 
These results suggest that a contribution of 50 percent to poverty reduction seems a reasonable 
goal for social protection to achieve.  What would this take?  Of our 47 countries, 19 countries 
are already achieving better than this standard, but there are 28 countries where social protection 
could do more.  How much more, and through what means? 
 
Figure 8 presents the benefit-cost ratio (BCR), defined as the poverty gap reduction per 
unit of total transfers, for 47 countries ranked from lowest to highest for four country income 
groupings:  (Low Income Countries (LIC), Lower Middle Income Countries (LMIC), Upper 
Middle Income Countries (UMIC), and High Income Countries (HIC).  The overall mean for the 
BCR is 8.2 percent while the median is 4.9 percent.  These are very low, but there are countries 
where the ratio is much better.  Specifically, the average benefit-cost ratio for the best 12 
countries (top 25 percent of the countries) is 21.7 percent.  At the maximum, the best value for a 
country is 40 percent.  We can thus ask what would happen if countries had poverty reduction 
efficiency no lower than these levels which are actually observed. 
 
Annex 6 presents the impact of social protection on poverty reduction with same budget 
but at different levels of poverty alleviation efficiency, for all the countries in ASPIRE grouped 
by income level.  The four scenarios are (i) the baseline, with actual efficiency in the country, (ii) 
if efficiency is lower than the global average, raise it to the global average, (iii) if efficiency is 
lower than the average of the top quartile of efficiencies, raise it to that level, and (iv) raise 
efficiency to the observed global maximum.  Figure 10 shows for what percentage of countries in 
each income grouping this sequence of raising efficiency succeeds in attaining the target of 
halving the poverty gap through social protection.   
 
As seen in Figure 10, with the current BCR of each country (the baseline), 40 percent of 
countries meet the poverty reduction target for social protection that is proposed in this paper. 
This increases to 59 percent of countries meeting the target when using the mean benefit-cost 
ratio of all the countries (0.082), 70 percent of countries when using the BCR of the top quartile  
(0.217), and 76 percent of countries when using the somewhat unrealistic maximum value 
(0.400).  In LICs, even with increased efficiency to the maximum (0.4), the fiscal resources are 
insufficient in more than half of countries, suggesting a need to reallocate existing non-social 
protection expenditure and/or mobilize additional budgetary resources. 
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Figure 10:  Percent Countries Achieving Poverty Reduction Target with BCR Scenarios, by 
Income Grouping 
 
 
 
Source:  Authors’ calculations 
 
For countries where efficiency gains alone are not sufficient, raising the social protection 
budget will have to be an important part of the social protection strategy and for achieving the 
poverty target.  Figure 9 gives the ratio of the budget to the poverty gap for our countries in 
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ascending order, grouped by income level.  Most striking is how much lower the budget ratios 
are for low and lower middle income countries as compared to upper middle countries.  The 
disparity is a function of larger poverty gaps on average coupled with smaller budgets to address 
these gaps in lower income countries.  
 
 As can be seen in Figure 11, there is considerable scope to increase the social protection 
budget level without raising the overall fiscal envelope.  The figure shows the current spending 
on social safety net programs (SSN, dark blue), Energy Subsidies (red), and ‘new SSN spending’ 
(light blue), where the new spending assumes that 50 percent of energy subsidies, which are 
often the least efficient for poverty reduction, are re-allocated to SSNs.  The potential increase in 
SSN spending is considerable, as in every developing country region except for Europe and 
Central Asia and Latin America, spending on energy subsidies exceeds that on social safety nets. 
In many countries, a reallocation of generally untargeted and inefficient energy subsidies, which 
can be particularly costly when energy prices are high, to transfers with stronger effects on 
poverty is feasible without having to increase overall spending.35  Of course not all countries 
subsidize energy, while others may have very limited fiscal capacity, and in these cases 
additional resources may be necessary to achieve their poverty reduction targets. 
 
Figure 11:  Current SSN, Energy Subsidy, and New SSN Spending*, %GDP 
 
 
 
Source:  Authors and Weigand and Grosh (2008), and IMF (2013). 
Note: * New SSN Spending assumes 50% of Energy Subsidies Reallocated to SSNs. 
 
                                                 
35 A number of countries are now implementing or considering such an approach.  
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As this paper has shown, countries can reach the poverty reduction target of 50 percent 
through social protection by either increasing generosity or the efficiency of public expenditure. 
Having used different scenarios for efficiency, we have shown that many countries can achieve 
the poverty target.  This is not the case for all countries, particularly Low Income and Lower 
Middle Income countries.  In these countries, the budget for social protection likely needs to be 
increased, though importantly this often does not require increasing the overall public 
expenditure envelope and may be achieved through fiscal reallocation.  
5. Conclusion 
 
In this paper we argue that social protection must be an integral part of the post-2015 
MDG framework.  While acknowledging that social protection could be conceived as a 
development goal in itself, we have followed an essentially instrumental perspective in our 
approach.  The evidence from across the developing world is clear:  social protection programs 
have resulted in (often significant) reductions in poverty – and their absence constitutes a 
potentially serious threat to efforts to end poverty.  More generally, they can contribute to 
improving equity, reducing income inequality and enhancing opportunities along the income 
distribution. 
 
We have also shown that this proposed role of social protection is realistic.  In other 
words, it is within the reach of a majority of developing countries.  The importance of this 
finding should not be minimized.  At the time the original MDGs were formulated few could 
have argued, on the basis of evidence, this was a realistic target.  But the last decade has seen a 
dramatic expansion in the number and size of social protection programs, particularly targeted 
cash transfers, across the developing world. 
 
The simulations we have presented in Section 4 are based on simple assumptions.  We 
focused on the most extreme form of poverty (i.e. a poverty line of $1.25 per day in PPP terms) 
and considered a somewhat arbitrary (albeit intuitive) target of assigning social protection 
programs the job of cutting the poverty gap in half.  Different assumptions (a higher poverty line, 
a relative –rather than an absolute—poverty line, a more or less ambitious target) would 
naturally affect the specific results.  Inequality (or vulnerability) rather than poverty may be used 
as the key evaluative criteria.  We welcome a debate on the ‘right’ assumptions – and plan to 
conduct further work exploring the implications of alternative assumptions.  This paper provides 
a (data-driven) framework under which those debates can take place in a fruitful manner.  
 
In this paper, the impact of social protection on poverty is taken as simple mechanical 
filling of the poverty gap by a transfer.  While simplistic – and even problematic from a policy 
perspective— the framework allows us to highlight the centrality of policy decisions regarding 
the level and share of government budgets reaching the poor and vulnerable (i.e. those in most 
need of social protection), however one defines those categories.   
 
As shown in Section 4 in many developing countries current levels of social protection 
spending allow the pursuit of poverty reduction goals.  How?  First, by seeking improvements in 
the efficiency of all programs.  This implies an emphasis on reforms that reduce administration 
costs (including leakages of different types) and increase the share of the budget reaching the 
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hands of intended beneficiaries.  Consolidation of small programs into larger ones using a 
systems approach is often one way in which such improvements can be achieved.  The use of 
new information and communication technologies (including in low income country settings) 
and enhanced accountability mechanisms provides useful entry points for such reforms. 
  
Second, by rationalizing (often overlapping) programs seeking to provide protection to 
similar target populations. Indeed, poverty reduction (or other) impacts can vary significantly 
across programs (both within and across countries).  Shifts from in-kind to cash transfers is often 
one way to rationalize already acceptable levels of social protection spending. 
 
Third, through a more careful focusing of fiscal resources to those more in need of social 
protection.  This would often require shifting resources across social protection programs. In our 
view, such discussions on coverage of social protection programs (‘who is covered and why’) 
needs to be more nuanced by asking questions such as if the groups are in fact the most 
vulnerable and poorest, versus basing this on ideolology or ‘common sense’.  A strong example 
is the elderly who are often not the poorest group in a country, and that social assistance may be 
better spent on children – even though political and cultural values may dictate otherwise. 
Answers to these questions will, naturally, depend on the goals society is willing to prioritize 
(e.g. the minimum level of income needed to achieve acceptable standards of living). 
Nonetheless, discussions on coverage (including in the context of ‘social floor’ proposals) cannot 
avoid dealing with such trade-offs without running the risk of placing social protection on an 
unsutainable path.36  
 
Improving individual program efficiency, rationalizing duplicative programs and 
prioritizing the use of fiscal resources on the basis of both equity and efficiency considerations 
are the core of efforts to strengthen social protection systems. 
 
In many countries, however, current levels of social protection spending are insufficient 
(even under the most optimistic assumptions regarding targeting efficiency) to enable a 
significant impact on poverty, let alone broader equity objectives.  Increasing budgets for social 
protection programs can, in many of those countries, conceivably be done by shifting resources 
away from often large, badly targeted and otherwise distortive generalized subsidies.  A prime 
example are fossil fuel subsidies.  A recent IMF study37 documents the extent of such subsidies.  
Even in Sub-Saharan Africa (which accounts for only about 4 percent of global energy 
subsidies), subsidies amount to 1½ percent of regional GDP or 5½ percent of total government 
revenues, with electricity subsidies accounting for over 70 percent.  It is hard not to see the 
potential for subsidy reform enabling the necessary increase in social protection. 
 
Of course, country conditions will vary and the right (and politically feasible) response 
will most likely differ across countries.  However, the evidence reviewed in this paper strongly 
suggests that social protection cannot and should not remain as the silent partner to the new set 
of development goals the international community is currently debating. 
                                                 
36 In this paper we have not delve into the intricacies of how to design social protection programs.  Considerations 
such as the need to set payment levels to both ensure adequacy and avoid savings and labor market distortions, or 
the need to define graduation policies that avoid perverse incentives remain at the core of the policy discussions. 
37 IMF (2013) http://www.imf.org/external/np/pp/eng/2013/012813.pdf. 
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Annex 1:  Measuring the Effect of Social Protection on Poverty 38 
 
The well-known FGT (Foster, Greer and Thorbecke, 1984) class of poverty indices is 
given by 
 
ܲሺߙሻ ൌ 1ܰ෍݉ܽݔ ቆ0, ቀ
ݖ െ ݕ௜
ݖ ቁቇ
ఈ
௜
 
 
where z is the poverty line; yi is income for person i; and (z-yi) is the “poverty gap” for 
person i – the difference between her income and the poverty line – expressed as a share of 
income at the poverty line in the above formula.  When  =0, we get the “headcount” poverty 
measure, the fraction of population below the poverty line. If ߙ  =1, then NzP(1)PGA is simply 
the amount of money needed to eliminate poverty with perfect targeting so that the poor and only 
the poor receive transfers.   
 
Let ti be the amount of transfer that person i receives through the programs of interest. 
Then if all transfers were ended the income measure for each person would be yi–ti.  Comparing 
the actual poverty with the poverty measure based on yi–ti is one measure of the poverty impact 
of social protection, assuming no behavioral responses.  Alternatives could be tried with the 
counterfactual income yi–kti for different values of k (for example, 0.5). 
 
For the PGAP measure (ie for  =1), we can write: 
 
ܲܩܣܲ
ܲܩܣܲ ൌ
∑ ݉݅݊൫ݐ௜, ሺݖ െ ݕ௜ሻ൯௜∈௣௢௢௥
∑ ݐ௜௜ ∙
∑ ݐ௜௜݊௧ ∙ ݊௧
1 ∙ ∑ ሺݖ െ ݕ௜ሻ௜݊௣௢௢௥ ∙ ݊௣௢௢௥
ൌ ቆ∑ ݉݅݊ሺݐ௜, ݌݃ܽ݌୧ሻ௜∈௣௢௢௥ ∑ ݐ௜௜ ቇ ቆ
ݐ̅
ܲܩܣܲതതതതതതതതቇ ቆ
݊௧
݊௣௢௢௥ቇ 
 
  = (Tp/B)/(B/PGAP) 
 
where Tp is transfers to the poor, and B is transfers to the poor and the non-poor, in other 
words the total transfer budget. 
 
  
                                                 
38 The idea of the decomposition was proposed by D. Coady and is described in detail in Tesliuc et al (forthcoming).  
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Annex 2:  List of Countries for which ASPIRE Indicators are Available (Most Recent Survey) 
 
 
Region  Classification  Country  Year  Survey 
Sample 
Size: HH 
AFR  LIC  Ghana  2005  Ghana Living Standard Survey (GLSS)  8,686 
AFR  LIC  Kenya  2005
Kenya Integrated Household Budget Survey 
(KIHBS) 13,093
AFR  UMIC  Mauritius  2006  Mauritius Household Budget Survey  6,720 
AFR  LIC  Malawi  2010  Integrated Household Survey  12,271 
AFR  LMIC  Nigeria 2010 Nigeria Living Standard Survey (NLSS)  4,867
AFR  LIC  Rwanda  2005 
Enquête Intégrale sur les Conditions de Vie des 
ménages (EICV)   6,900 
        
EAP  LIC  Cambodia  2008  Household Economic Survey  3,548 
EAP  LMIC  Indonesia  2009  SUSENAS  67,174 
EAP  LIC  Lao  2008  Expenditure and Consumption Survey  8,296 
EAP  UMIC  Malaysia 2008 Household Income Survey 42,645
EAP  LMIC  Mongolia  2007  Socio‐Economic Survey  11,172 
EAP  LMIC  Philippines  2006  Integrated Survey of Households  38,483 
EAP  LMIC  Thailand  2009  Household Socio‐Economic Survey  43,844 
EAP  LMIC  Timor‐Leste 2007 Timor‐Leste Survey of Living Standards  4,477
EAP  LMIC  Vietnam  2006  Household Living Standard Survey  9,189 
        
ECA  LMIC  Armenia  2008  Integrated Living Conditions Survey  7,872 
ECA  UMIC  Azerbaijan  2008 
Household and Targeted SA Monitoring and 
Evaluation Survey  6,518 
ECA  UMIC  Belarus 2008 Household Budget Survey 5,328
ECA  UMIC 
Bosnia and 
Herzegovina  2007  Household Budget Survey  7,468 
ECA  UMIC  Bulgaria  2007  Multitopic Household Survey  4,194 
ECA  LMIC  Georgia 2007 Household Budget Survey 5,256
ECA  UMIC  Kazakhstan  2007  Household Budget Survey  12,000 
ECA  LMIC  Kosovo  2006  Household Budget Survey  2,392 
ECA  LIC  Kyrgyzstan 2006
Integrated Sample Household Budget and Labor 
Survey 4,862
ECA  HIC  Latvia  2008 Household Budget Survey 4,002
ECA  UMIC  Macedonia  2005  Household Budget Survey  4,215 
ECA  HIC  Poland  2005  Household Budget Survey  34,767 
ECA  UMIC  Romania 2008 Household Budget Survey 31,743
ECA  UMIC  Russia  2007 Household Budget Survey 212,329
ECA  UMIC  Serbia  2007  Household Budget Survey  5,557 
ECA  UMIC  Turkey  2008  Household Budget Survey  8,548 
ECA  LMIC  Ukraine 2006 Household Budget Survey 10,499
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LAC  UMIC  Argentina  2010 Encuesta Permanente de Hogares Continua  35,206
LAC  LMIC  Bolivia  2007  Encuesta de Hogares  4,148 
LAC  UMIC  Brazil  2009  Pesquisa Nacional por Amostra de Domicilios  129,333 
LAC  UMIC  Chile  2009 
Encuesta de Caracterización Socio‐Económica 
Nacional (CASEN)  71,460 
LAC  UMIC  Colombia  2003  Encuesta de Calidad de Vida  22,949 
LAC  UMIC  Costa Rica  2009  Encuesta de Hogares de Propósitos Múltiples  13,244 
LAC  UMIC 
Dominican 
Republic  2009 Encuesta de Fuerza de Trabajo 8,270
LAC  LMIC  Ecuador  2010  Encuesta de Empleo y Subempleo y Desempleo  20,670 
LAC  LMIC  El Salvador  2009  Encuesta de Hogares de Propósitos Múltiples  20,361 
LAC  LMIC  Guatemala  2006  Encuesta Nacional de Condiciones de Vida  13,686 
LAC  LMIC  Honduras  2009 
Encuesta Permanente de Hogares de Propósitos 
Múltiples  21,112 
LAC  UMIC  Mexico  2010 
Encuesta Nacional de Ingresos y Gastos de los 
Hogares  27,655 
LAC  LMIC  Nicaragua  2005 
Encuesta Nacional de Hogares sobre Medición de 
Nivel de Vida  6,884 
LAC  UMIC  Panama  2008  Encuesta de Niveles de Vida  7,045 
LAC  LMIC  Paraguay  2009  Encuesta Permanente de Hogares  4,439 
LAC  UMIC  Peru  2009
Encuesta Nacional de Hogares‐ Condiciones de 
Vida y Pobreza 21,794
LAC  UMIC  Uruguay  2009  Encuesta Continua de Hogares  46,936 
LAC  UMIC  Venezuela  2006  Encuesta de Hogares por Muestreo  38,492 
                 
MNA  LMIC  Egypt  2008 
Income and Expenditure Survey panel sub 
sample  3,553 
MNA  LMIC  Yemen  2005  Household Budget Survey  13,136 
MNA  LMIC 
West Bank 
and Gaza  2007  Expenditure and Consumption Survey  1,213 
              
SAR  LIC  Afghanistan  2007 
National Risk and Vulnerability Assessment  
Survey (NRVA)  20,543 
SAR  LIC  Bangladesh  2010  Household Income and Expenditure Survey  12,240 
SAR  LMIC  Bhutan  2007 Bhutan Living Standard Survey 9,798
SAR  LMIC  India  2009  Socio‐Economic Survey  102,004 
SAR  LIC  Nepal  2010  Nepal Living Standards Survey  7,180 
SAR  LMIC  Pakistan  2010
Pakistan Social and Living Standards 
Measurement Survey 6,982
SAR  LMIC  Sri Lanka  2008  Sri Lanka Labour Force Survey  18,544 
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Annex 3:  Coverage by Social Protection, % of Population and % of Poorest Quintile  
 
Country   Year 
Coverage, %  Generosity/adequacy, all transfers 
Population  Bottom 20%  Of the poor* 
Average 
amount, 
$/day, PPP 
As % of 
consumption 
Afghanistan  2007  15  21.8  21.9  0.01  24.7 
Argentina  2010  37.4  23.8  13.4  2.66  37.7 
Armenia  2008  58.2  28.8  24.5  0.75  50.8 
Azerbaijan  2008  63.6  40.1  43.3  0.79  39 
Bangladesh  2010  19.2  26.7  26.9  0.05  0.6 
Bulgaria  2007  70.7  56.9  ‐  2.18  5 
Bosnia and Herzegovina  2007  51.6  11.4  8.2  2.27  57.8 
Belarus  2008  72.5  57.4  n.a.  3.81  116.3 
Bolivia  2007  16.3  9.8  9.7  0.44  38.6 
Brazil  2009  51.8  47.9  37.2  2.85  36.9 
Bhutan  2007  2.4  2  2.3  0.01  2.3 
Chile  2009  93.1  89.2  78.1  1.31  20.8 
Costa Rica  2009  57.4  63.7  49  n.a.  n.a. 
Dominican Republic  2009  28.1  35.2  39.1  0.29  13.2 
Ecuador  2010  67.3  82.1  70.6  0.72  26.1 
Egypt, Arab Rep.  2008  55.5  54.9  60.3  0.53  15 
Georgia  2007  58.2  21  22.4  0.64  115.7 
Ghana  2005  27.9  2.2  0.5  0.09  13.2 
Guatemala  2006  46.9  52.2  50.4  0.13  8.1 
Indonesia  2009  45.1  65.8  65.3  n.a.  n.a. 
India  2009  31  25.4  25.1  n.a.  n.a. 
Kazakhstan  2007  45.8  42.2  35.4  0.76  31.9 
Kenya  2005  18.2  30.5  24.9  0.04  5.1 
Kyrgyz Republic  2006  45.5  27.9  29.8  0.41  33 
Cambodia  2008  3.2  0.2  0.2  0.01  5 
Kosovo  2006  43.8  26.9  n.a.  0.14  3.5 
Lao PDR  2008  1.7  n.a.  n.a.  0.02  85.9 
Sri Lanka  2008  35.7  52.2  56  0.15  8 
Latvia  2008  80.6  65.9  100  3.92  65.7 
Mexico  2010  86.9  57.4  60.1  0.8  32.6 
Macedonia, FYR  2005  54.5  15.8  25.9  1.42  73.8 
Mongolia  2007  93.1  91.5  90.7  0.73  32.2 
Mozambique  2008  7  7.8  6.1  0.02  274.6 
Mauritius  2006  39.1  37.1  45.1  1.3  33.2 
Malawi  2010  21.1  21.2  20.6  0.01  4.9 
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*at poverty line of $1.25 /day/per capita 
 
Notes:  Coverage is percentage of population participating in Social Protection and Labor programs (includes direct 
and indirect beneficiaries).  The indicator is estimated by program, for the entire population and by quintiles of post-
transfer welfare distribution.  Programs are aggregated into Social Assistance, Social Insurance and Labor Market 
according to the SP Adept guidance note.  Indicators for all Social Protection and Labor programs provide the totals 
summing up the social assistance, social insurance and labor market figures.  Specifically, coverage is:  (Number of 
individuals in the group who live in a household where at least one member receives the transfer) / (Number of 
households in that group). 
 
Adequacy/generosity:  Generosity is the total transfer amount received by all beneficiaries in a group as a share of 
the total welfare of beneficiaries in that group.  The indicator is estimated by program, for the entire population and 
by quintiles of post-transfer welfare distribution. Programs are aggregated into Social Assistance, Social Insurance 
and Labor Market according to the SP Adept guidance note.   Indicators for all Social Protection and Labor 
programs provide the totals summing up the social assistance, social insurance and labor market figures. 
  
Malaysia  2008  15  19.6  24  0.45  20.5 
Nigeria  2010  5.8  1.7  1.7  0.03  10.7 
Nicaragua  2005  62.5  70.7  69.9  0.34  31.3 
Nepal  2010  45.9  50.2  55.4  0.09  3.7 
Pakistan  2010  19.1  13.7  17.2  0.15  15.6 
Panama  2008  77.5  78.8  74.6  1.04  19.7 
Peru  2009  66.3  85  83.3  0.56  17.7 
Philippines  2006  7.5  n.a.  n.a.  0.1  42.5 
Poland  2005  69.7  64.1  76.2  4.1  70.4 
Paraguay  2009  40.4  45.5  40.8  0.51  61.8 
Romania  2008  82.7  78.1  n.a.  2.65  61.4 
Russian Federation  2007  58.5  46.8  63.2  n.a.  n.a. 
Rwanda  2005  2.2  0.4  1.3  0.03  3.6 
El Salvador  2009  74.5  77.9  77.5  0.04  4.5 
Thailand  2009  99.2  82.6  85.1  0.34  7.9 
Timor‐Leste  2007  26.4  26.8  26.3  0.05  1.7 
Turkey  2008  64.1  55.5  59.4  0.21  3 
Ukraine  2006  67.4  46.3  100  2.83  60.8 
Uruguay  2009  68  82.7  56.1  3.58  23.5 
Venezuela, RB  2006  14.1  3.8  3.1  n.a.  n.a. 
Vietnam  2006  28.7  37  37  0.18  29.3 
West Bank and Gaza  2007  13.3  30.4  33.4  0.01  6.9 
Yemen, Rep.  2005  28.8  27.6  26.8  0.08  9.4 
Serbia  2007  61.5  43.4  83.2  3.04  65.8 
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Annex 4:  Impact of Social Protection on Poverty and Inequality Indices (% Reduction)  
 
 
Country   Year 
Poverty Headcount 
Reduction  Poverty Gap Reduction  Inequality reduction 
Lowest 
20%  
$1.25/day 
ppp 
Lowest 
20%  
$1.25/day 
ppp 
Gini index 
% Gini 
reduction With 
Transfer 
Without 
Transfer 
Afghanistan  2007  1%  1%  3%  2%  0.277  0.2771  0% 
Argentina  2010  31%  74%  55%  69%  0.4464  0.4911  9% 
Armenia  2008  47%  92%  86%  97%  0.2776  0.3586  23% 
Azerbaijan  2008  39%  92%  75%  95%  0.3048  0.3578  15% 
Bangladesh  2010  2%  7%  8%  20%  0.2688  0.2684  0% 
Bulgaria  2007  8%    13%    0.2744  0.2803  2% 
Bosnia & 
Herzegovina  2007  39%  98%  78%  99%  0.3556  0.4287  17% 
Belarus  2008  54%  100%  94%  100%  0.2729  0.4461  39% 
Bolivia  2007  13%  13%  14%  15%  0.5835  0.5919  1% 
Brazil  2009  38%  57%  52%  56%  0.5504  0.5958  8% 
Bhutan  2007  0%  0%  0%  1%  0.2946  0.2947  0% 
Chile  2009  27%  60%  49%  61%  0.5223  0.5531  6% 
Costa Rica  2009           0.5161  n.a.   
Dominican 
Republic  2009  9%  32%  19%  48%  0.4886  0.4947  1% 
Ecuador  2010  19%  40%  36%  43%  0.4948  0.5119  3% 
Egypt, Arab 
Rep.  2008  29%  86%  70%  96%  0.3097  0.3311  6% 
Georgia  2007  40%  55%  81%  79%  0.3866  0.4724  18% 
Ghana  2005  2%  5%  4%  12%  0.419  0.4177  0% 
Guatemala  2006  5%  6%  10%  9%  0.5538  0.5565  0% 
Indonesia  2009           0.3669  n.a.   
India  2009           0.4285  n.a.   
Kazakhstan  2007  40%  97%  80%  99%  0.2734  0.328  17% 
Kenya  2005  4%  1%  11%  3%  0.4764  0.4777  0% 
Kyrgyz 
Republic  2006  43%  72%  86%  90%  0.3231  0.3902  17% 
Cambodia  2008  1%  1%  3%  2%  0.3136  0.3133  0% 
Kosovo  2006  4%    10%    0.303  0.3058  1% 
Lao PDR  2008  2%  1%  13%  5%  0.314  0.315  0% 
Sri Lanka  2008  13%  22%  42%  42%  0.4004  0.4085  2% 
Latvia  2008  49%  100%  88%  100%  0.3381  0.4675  28% 
Mexico  2010  20%  46%  43%  60%  0.5089  0.529  4% 
Macedonia, 
FYR  2005  40%  93%  78%  98%  0.4026  0.4749  15% 
Mongolia  2007  45%  84%  81%  93%  0.3103  0.3794  18% 
Mozambique  2008  3%    12%    0.4582  0.4597  0% 
Mauritius  2006  30%  93%  59%  93%  0.3649  0.3912  7% 
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Notes:  Inequality reduction: Simulated percentage change on Gini inequality coefficient of discontinuing Social Protection and 
Labor programs.  The Gini coefficient of the population’s income distribution is measured assuming the absence of the programs 
(pre-transfer welfare distribution).  The indicator is estimated for the entire population and by programs.  Programs are 
aggregated into Social Assistance, Social Insurance and Labor Market according to the SP Adept guidance note.  Indicators for 
all Social Protection and Labor programs provide the totals summing up the social assistance, social insurance and labor market 
figures. 
 
Poverty headcount reduction: Simulated change (%) on poverty headcount of discontinuing Social Protection and Labor 
programs.  Poverty headcount ratio is the percentage of the population below the poverty line and it is measured assuming the 
absence of the programs (pre-transfer welfare distribution).  The indicator is estimated for the entire population and by programs. 
Programs are aggregated into Social Assistance, Social Insurance and Labor Market according to the SP Adept guidance note.   
Indicators for all Social Protection and Labor programs provide the totals summing up the social assistance, social insurance and 
labor market figures. 
 
Poverty gap reduction: Simulated change (%) on poverty gap of discontinuing Social Protection and Labor programs.  The 
poverty gap index is the average percentage shortfall in income of poor people, from the poverty line and it is measured assuming 
the absence of the programs (pre-transfer welfare distribution).  The indicator is estimated for the entire population and by 
programs.  Programs are aggregated into Social Assistance, Social Insurance and Labor Market according to the SP Adept 
guidance note.  Indicators for all Social Protection and Labor programs provide the totals summing up the social assistance, 
social insurance and labor market figures  
 
Note: () represents increase in inequality due to social protection    
Malawi  2010  0%  0%  1%  1%  0.4498  0.449  0% 
Malaysia  2008  10%  82%  25%  90%  0.4626  0.472  2% 
Nigeria  2010  0%  0%  1%  0%  0.4002  0.4002  0% 
Nicaragua  2005  15%  16%  25%  22%  0.5231  0.5324  2% 
Nepal  2010  6%  21%  18%  38%  0.3487  0.3499  0% 
Pakistan  2010  12%  60%  30%  80%  0.2985  0.3025  1% 
Panama  2008  12%  20%  19%  18%  0.5432  0.5486  1% 
Peru  2009  6%  24%  16%  30%  0.4905  0.4847  ‐1% 
Philippines  2006  6%  7%  25%  16%  0.3713  0.3732  1% 
Poland  2005  64%  100%  94%  100%  0.3224  0.5498  41% 
Paraguay  2009  5%  10%  10%  13%  0.5104  0.5105  0% 
Romania  2008  63%  100%  94%  100%  0.2809  0.4891  43% 
Russian Federation  2007           0.4233  n.a.   
Rwanda  2005  0%  0%  1%  0%  0.5147  0.5144  0% 
El Salvador  2009  1%  2%  3%  5%  0.4853  0.4857  0% 
Thailand  2009  7%  35%  18%  38%  0.4871  0.4887  0% 
Timor‐Leste  2007  10%  5%  45%  12%  0.2726  0.2806  3% 
Turkey  2008  4%  14%  5%  12%  0.3738  0.3743  0% 
Ukraine  2006  57%  100%  91%  100%  0.2898  0.4309  33% 
Uruguay  2009  40%  97%  66%  98%  0.4449  0.4942  10% 
Venezuela, RB  2006           0.4694  n.a.   
Vietnam  2006  18%  19%  56%  37%  0.3295  0.3452  5% 
West Bank and Gaza  2007  1%  6%  7%  8%  0.4115  0.4132  0% 
Yemen, Rep.  2005  10%  19%  23%  33%  0.3914  0.3975  2% 
Serbia  2007  54%  100%  90%  100%  0.3098  0.4462  31% 
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 Annex 5:  Decomposition of Poverty Gap Reduction by Social Protection Programs 
 
   IN PPP $  Ratios  Decomposition 
   Transfer amount 
Poverty 
gap 
Poverty 
gap 
reduction, 
$ in PPP 
Poverty 
gap 
reductio
n,% 
estimate 
BCR 
Budget 
as % of 
Pgap 
Due to 
budget 
Due 
to 
Efficie
ncy 
 Afghanistan   181,685  1,378,195  24,888 2%  14% 13%  0.5  0.5
 Argentina   66,014,239  790,489  542,493 69%  1% 8351%  ‐11.8  12.8
 Armenia   2,490,795  249,774  241,917 97%  10% 997%  ‐72  73
 Azerbaijan   5,967,932  250,919  238,702 95%  4% 2378%  ‐63.5  64.5
 Bangladesh   6,771,077  649,637  129,927 20%  2% 1042%  ‐1.5  2.5
 Bulgaria                          
 Bosnia and 
Herzegovina   7,824,009  233,545  231,821 99%  3% 3350%  ‐474.1  475.1
 Belarus   35,027,524  1,988,476  1,988,476 100%  6% 1762%       
 Bolivia   4,305,659  996,133  145,295 15%  3% 432%  ‐0.8  1.8
 Brazil   544,396,545  20,640,650  11,552,067 56%  2% 2638%  ‐5.6  6.6
 Bhutan   498  12,140  78 1%  16% 4%  0.6  0.4
 Chile   22,044,412  395,001  239,522 61%  1% 5581%  ‐8  9
 Costa Rica                    
 Dominican 
Republic   2,814,297  70,092  33,837 48%  1% 4015%  ‐5.1  6.1
 Ecuador   10,107,679  737,298  317,497 43%  3% 1371%  ‐3.1  4.1
 Egypt, Arab 
Rep.   39,645,000  2,184,375  2,100,000 96%  5% 1815%  ‐73.6  74.6
 Georgia   2,586,014  733,340  575,729 79%  22% 353%  ‐5.2  6.2
 Ghana   2,098,462  230,387  27,757 12%  1% 911%  ‐1  2
 Guatemala   1,736,679  1,041,039  93,613 9%  5% 167%  ‐0.2  1.2
 Indonesia                          
 India                    
 Kazakhstan   11,715,484  510,022  506,172 99%  4% 2297%  ‐413.7  414.7
 Kenya   1,415,145  6,590,480  216,154 3%  15% 22%  0.5  0.5
 Kyrgyz 
Republic   2,152,186  512,487  459,292 90%  21% 420%  ‐13.1  14.1
 Cambodia   123,841  471,062  8,323 2%  7% 26%  0.3  0.7
 Kosovo   279,647                      
 Lao PDR   104,295  433,862  19,625 5%  19% 24%  0.5  0.5
 Sri Lanka   2,914,311  680,006  284,145 42%  10% 429%  ‐1.7  2.7
 Latvia   8,769,540  279,317  279,037 100%  3% 3140% 
‐
3,438.
10 
3,439
.10
 Mexico   89,925,737  7,346,506  4,391,015 60%  5% 1224%  ‐4.9  5.9
 Macedonia, 
FYR   2,783,089  172,485  168,320 98%  6% 1614%  ‐113.8  114.8
 Mongolia   1,768,490  176,535  164,141 93%  9% 1002%  ‐31.7  32.7
 Mozambique   437,205              
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Malawi   145,224  645,048  3,525  1%  2%  23%  0.3  0.7 
 Malaysia   11,225,035  62,570  56,313  90%  1%  17940%  ‐49.3  50.3 
 Nigeria   439,024  22,479,670  60,976  0%  14%  2%  0.7  0.3 
 Nicaragua   1,720,198  450,899  99,774  22%  6%  382%  ‐0.9  1.9 
 Nepal   2,573,856  182,842  70,324  39%  3%  1408%  ‐2.8  3.8 
 Pakistan   19,060,699  410,508  328,406  80%  2%  4643%  ‐17.2  18.2 
 Panama   3,445,067  146,482  25,655  18%  1%  2352%  ‐1.8  2.8 
 Peru   17,264,850  545,384  165,151  30%  1%  3166%  ‐2.9  3.9 
 Philippines   8,750,026  4,357,923  704,958  16%  8%  201%  ‐0.4  1.4 
 Poland   154,808,253  11,125,133  11,120,415  100%  7%  1392%  ‐6,207.30  6,208.30 
 Paraguay   3,168,079  232,626  29,664  13%  1%  1362%  ‐1.3  2.3 
 Romania   57,109,186  5,005,284  5,005,284  100%  9%  1141%       
 Russian Federation              
 Rwanda   27,525  5,528,739  9,491  0%  35%  1%  0.8  0.2 
 El Salvador   264,343  289,220  15,262  5%  6%  91%  0  1 
 Thailand   21,840,341  297,355  112,513  38%  1%  7345%  ‐4.4  5.4 
 Timor‐Leste   52,073  175,406  20,651  12%  40%  30%  0.6  0.4 
 Turkey   14,669,242  217,877  26,145  12%  0%  6733%  ‐2  3 
 Ukraine   128,486,577  5,721,023  5,721,023  100%  5%  2246%    
 Uruguay   10,821,326  67,616  66,483  98%  1%  16004%  ‐300.3  301.3 
 Venezuela, RB              
 Vietnam   14,731,080  7,701,650  2,876,520  37%  20%  191%  ‐0.7  1.7 
 West Bank and Gaza   35,485  172,441  12,958  8%  37%  21%  0.6  0.4 
 Yemen, Rep.   1,642,337  340,900  112,798  33%  7%  482%  ‐1.4  2.4 
 Serbia   22,512,394  936,565  936,565  100%  4%  2404%  ‐316.4  316.4 
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Annex 6: Poverty Gap Changes with Differing Efficiency Scenarios, Low Income Countries (LIC) 
 
 
 
 
 
 
   (1)  (2)  (3)  (4)  (5)  (6)  (7) 
Country  % Poverty 
Gap 
reduction 
‐ current 
BCR ‐
Actual 
BCR ‐ Max 
of 1) 
actual or 
2) mean 
all 
countries 
(.082) 
% Pgap 
reduction 
with BCR 
from   (3) 
BCR ‐ 
Max 
of 1) 
actual 
or 2) 
BCR 
of top 
25% 
(.217) 
% reduction Pgap 
with BCR from   (5) 
BCR ‐ Max of 
1) actual or 2) 
BCR max  
(.400) 
  
Rwanda  0.002  0.345  0.345  0.002  0.345  0.002  0.002 
Cambodia  0.018  0.067  0.082  0.021  0.217  0.057  0.105 
Afghanistan  0.018  0.137  0.137  0.018  0.217  0.029  0.053 
Kenya  0.033  0.153  0.153  0.033  0.217  0.047  0.086 
Lao PDR  0.045  0.188  0.188  0.045  0.217  0.052  0.096 
Ghana  0.12  0.013  0.082  0.743          
Bangladesh  0.2  0.019  0.082  0.85          
Nepal  0.385  0.027  0.082  1.148          
Kyrgyz 
Republic  0.896                   
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Annex 6 (cont.): Poverty Gap Changes with Differing Budget Efficiency Scenarios, Lower 
Middle Income Countries (LMIC) 
 
 
   (1)  (2)  (3)  (4)  (5)  (6)  (7) 
Country  % Poverty 
Gap 
reduction 
‐ current 
BCR ‐
Actual
BCR ‐ 
Max of 
1) actual 
or 
2)mean 
all 
countries 
(.082) 
% Pgap 
reduction 
with BCR 
from   
(3)
BCR ‐ 
Max of 
1) actual 
or 2) 
BCR of 
top 25% 
(.217) 
% 
reduction 
Pgap 
with BCR 
from (5) 
BCR ‐ 
Max of 
1) actual 
or 2) 
BCR max 
(.400)  
Nigeria  0.003  0.139  0.139  0.003 0.217  0.004  0.008
Bhutan  0.006  0.156  0.156  0.006 0.217  0.009  0.016
El Salvador  0.053  0.058  0.082  0.075 0.217  0.199  0.366
West Bank and 
Gaza  0.075  0.365  0.365  0.075 0.365  0.075  0.082
Guatemala  0.09  0.054  0.082  0.136 0.217  0.363  0.667
Timor‐Leste  0.118  0.397  0.397  0.118 0.397  0.118  0.119
Paraguay  0.128  0.009  0.082  1.11        
Bolivia  0.146  0.034  0.082  0.352 0.217  0.94   
Philippines  0.162  0.081  0.082  0.164 0.217  0.436  0.803
Nicaragua  0.221  0.058  0.082  0.311 0.217  0.829   
Yemen, Rep.  0.331  0.069  0.082  0.393 0.217  1.047   
Vietnam  0.373  0.195  0.195  0.373 0.217  0.416  0.765
Thailand  0.378  0.005  0.082  5.987         
Sri Lanka  0.418  0.098  0.082  0.349 0.217  0.932   
Ecuador  0.431  0.031  0.082  1.118        
Georgia  0.785                  
Pakistan  0.8                  
Mongolia  0.93                  
Egypt, Arab Rep.  0.961                  
Armenia  0.969                  
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Annex 6 (cont.): Poverty Gap Changes with Differing Budget Efficiency Scenarios, Upper 
Middle Income Countries (UMIC) 
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7)
Country
Malawi 0.005 0.024 0.082 0.018 0.217 0.049 0.09
Turkey 0.12 0.002 0.082 5.489
Panama 0.175 0.007 0.082 1.917
Peru 0.303 0.01 0.082 2.581
Dominican  0.483 0.012 0.082 3.273
Brazil 0.56
Mexico 0.598
Chile 0.606
Argentina 0.686
Malaysia 0.9
Mauritius 0.929
Azerbaijan 0.951
Macedonia, 0.976
Uruguay 0.983
Kazakhstan 0.992
Bosnia and  0.993
BCR ‐ Max 
of 1) 
actual  or 
2) BCR 
max (.400)
% Poverty 
Gap 
reduction ‐
current
BCR ‐
Actual
BCR ‐ Max 
of 1) 
actual  or 
2)mean all  
countries  
(.082)
% Pgap 
reduction 
with BCR 
from 
(3)
BCR ‐ Max 
of 1) 
actual  or 
2) BCR of 
top 25% 
(.217)
% 
reduction 
Pgap with 
BCR from 
(5)
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Annex 6 (cont.): Poverty Gap Changes with Differing Budget Efficiency Scenarios, High 
  Income Countries (HIC) 
 
 
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7)
Country
Latvia 0.999
Poland 1.000
% Poverty 
Gap 
reduction ‐
current
BCR ‐
Actual
BCR ‐ Max 
of 1) 
actual  or 
2)mean all  
countries  
(.082)
% Pgap 
reduction 
with BCR 
from      (3)
BCR ‐ Max 
of 1) 
actual  or 
2) BCR of 
top 25% 
(.217)
% 
reduction 
Pgap with 
BCR from 
(5)
BCR ‐ Max 
of 1) 
actual  or 
2) BCR 
max (.400)
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Annex7: Official List of Current MDG Goals, Targets and Indicators39 
                                                 
39 The Millennium Development Goals and targets come from the Millennium Declaration, signed by 189 countries, 
including 147 heads of State and Government, in September 2000 
(http://www.un.org/millennium/declaration/ares552e.htm) and from further agreement by member states at the 2005 
World Summit (Resolution adopted by the General Assembly - A/RES/60/1, 
http://www.un.org/Docs/journal/asp/ws.asp?m=A/RES/60/1). The goals and targets are interrelated and should be seen 
as a whole. They represent a partnership between the developed countries and the developing countries “to create an 
environment – at the national and global levels alike – which is conducive to development and the elimination of 
poverty”. Source: http://mdgs.un.org/unsd/mdg/host.aspx?Content=indicators/officiallist.htm 
Goals and Targets Indicators for monitoring progress 
Goal 1: Eradicate extreme poverty and hunger 
Target 1.A: Halve, between 1990 and 2015, the 
proportion of people whose income is less than one 
dollar a day 
1.1 Proportion of population below $1 (PPP) per dayi 
1.2 Poverty gap ratio  
1.3 Share of poorest quintile in national consumption 
Target 1.B: Achieve full and productive employment and 
decent work for all, including women and young people 
 
1.4 Growth rate of GDP per person employed 
1.5 Employment-to-population ratio 
1.6 Proportion of employed people living below $1 (PPP) per 
day 
1.7 Proportion of own-account and contributing family 
workers in total employment  
Target 1.C: Halve, between 1990 and 2015, the 
proportion of people who suffer from hunger 
1.8 Prevalence of underweight children under-five years of 
age 
1.9 Proportion of population below minimum level of dietary 
energy consumption 
Goal 2: Achieve universal primary education 
Target 2.A: Ensure that, by 2015, children everywhere, 
boys and girls alike, will be able to complete a full 
course of primary schooling 
2.1 Net enrolment ratio in primary education 
2.2 Proportion of pupils starting grade 1 who reach last grade 
of  primary  
2.3 Literacy rate of 15-24 year-olds, women and men 
Goal 3: Promote gender equality and empower women 
Target 3.A: Eliminate gender disparity in primary and 
secondary education, preferably by 2005, and in all 
levels of education no later than 2015 
3.1 Ratios of girls to boys in primary, secondary and tertiary 
education 
3.2 Share of women in wage employment in the non-
agricultural sector 
3.3 Proportion of seats held by women in national parliament 
Goal 4: Reduce child mortality  
Target 4.A: Reduce by two-thirds, between 1990 and 
2015, the under-five mortality rate 
  
4.1 Under-five mortality rate 
4.2 Infant mortality rate 
4.3 Proportion of 1 year-old children immunised against 
measles 
Goal 5: Improve maternal health  
Target 5.A: Reduce by three quarters, between 1990 and 
2015, the maternal mortality ratio 
5.1 Maternal mortality ratio 
5.2 Proportion of births attended by skilled health personnel  
Target 5.B: Achieve, by 2015, universal access to 
reproductive health 
 
5.3 Contraceptive prevalence rate  
5.4 Adolescent birth rate 
5.5 Antenatal care coverage (at least one visit and at least four 
visits) 
5.6 Unmet need for family planning  
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Goal 6: Combat HIV/AIDS, malaria and other diseases 
Target 6.A: Have halted by 2015 and begun to reverse 
the spread of HIV/AIDS 
  
  
  
  
6.1 HIV prevalence among population aged 15-24 years  
6.2 Condom use at last high-risk sex 
6.3  Proportion of population aged 15-24 years with  
  comprehensive correct knowledge of HIV/AIDS 
6.4 Ratio of school attendance of orphans to school 
attendance of non-orphans aged 10-14 years 
Target 6.B: Achieve, by 2010, universal access to 
treatment for HIV/AIDS for all those who need it 
6.5 Proportion of population with advanced HIV infection 
with access to antiretroviral drugs 
Target 6.C: Have halted by 2015 and begun to reverse 
the incidence of malaria and other major diseases 
  
  
  
  
6.6 Incidence and death rates associated with malaria 
6.7 Proportion of children under 5 sleeping under insecticide-
treated bed-nets 
6.8 Proportion of children under 5 with fever who are treated 
with appropriate anti-malarial drugs 
6.9 Incidence, prevalence and death rates associated with 
tuberculosis 
6.10 Proportion of tuberculosis cases detected and cured under 
directly observed treatment  short course  
Goal 7: Ensure environmental sustainability 
Target 7.A: Integrate the principles of sustainable 
development into country policies and programmes and 
reverse the loss of environmental resources 
  
   
Target 7.B: Reduce biodiversity loss, achieving,  by 
2010, a significant reduction in the rate of loss 
7.1 Proportion of land area covered by forest 
7.2 CO2 emissions, total, per capita and per $1 GDP (PPP) 
7.3 Consumption of ozone-depleting substances 
7.4 Proportion of fish stocks within safe biological limits 
7.5 Proportion of total water resources used   
7.6 Proportion of terrestrial and marine areas protected 
7.7 Proportion of species threatened with extinction 
Target 7.C: Halve, by 2015, the proportion of people 
without sustainable access to safe drinking water and 
basic sanitation 
7.8 Proportion of population using an improved drinking 
water source 
7.9 Proportion of population using an improved sanitation 
facility 
Target 7.D: By 2020, to have achieved a significant 
improvement in the lives of at least 100 million slum 
dwellers 
 
7.10 Proportion of urban population living in slumsii 
Goal 8: Develop a global partnership for development 
Target 8.A: Develop further an open, rule-based, 
predictable, non-discriminatory trading and financial 
system 
 
Includes a commitment to good governance, 
development and poverty reduction – both nationally and 
internationally 
 
Target 8.B: Address the special needs of the least 
developed countries 
 
Includes: tariff and quota free access for the least 
developed countries' exports; enhanced programme of 
debt relief for heavily indebted poor countries (HIPC) 
and cancellation of official bilateral debt; and more 
Some of the indicators listed below are monitored separately 
for the least developed countries (LDCs), Africa, landlocked 
developing countries and small island developing States. 
Official development assistance (ODA) 
8.1 Net ODA, total and to the least developed countries, as 
percentage of OECD/DAC donors’ gross national income 
8.2 Proportion of total bilateral, sector-allocable ODA of 
OECD/DAC donors to basic social services (basic 
education, primary health care, nutrition, safe water and 
sanitation) 
8.3 Proportion of bilateral official development assistance of 
OECD/DAC donors that is untied 
8.4 ODA received in landlocked developing countries as a 
proportion of their gross national incomes 
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_________________________ 
i For monitoring country poverty trends, indicators based on national poverty lines should be used, where available. 
ii The actual proportion of people living in slums is measured by a proxy, represented by the urban population living in households 
with at least one of the four characteristics: (a) lack of access to improved water supply; (b) lack of access to improved sanitation; (c) 
overcrowding (3 or more persons per room); and (d) dwellings made of non-durable material. 
 
 
generous ODA for countries committed to poverty 
reduction 
 
 
Target 8.C: Address the special needs of landlocked 
developing countries and small island developing States 
(through the Programme of Action for the Sustainable 
Development of Small Island Developing States and the 
outcome of the twenty-second special session of the 
General Assembly) 
 
 
 
Target 8.D: Deal comprehensively with the debt 
problems of developing countries through national and 
international measures in order to make debt sustainable 
in the long term 
8.5 ODA received in small island developing States as a 
proportion of their gross national incomes 
Market access 
8.6 Proportion of total developed country imports (by value 
and excluding arms) from developing countries and least 
developed countries, admitted free of duty 
8.7 Average tariffs imposed by developed countries on 
agricultural products and textiles and clothing from 
developing countries 
8.8 Agricultural support estimate for OECD countries as a 
percentage of their gross domestic product 
8.9 Proportion of ODA provided to help build trade capacity 
Debt sustainability 
8.10 Total number of countries that have reached their HIPC 
decision points and number that have reached their HIPC 
completion points (cumulative) 
8.11 Debt relief committed under HIPC and MDRI Initiatives 
8.12 Debt service as a percentage of exports of goods and 
services 
Target 8.E: In cooperation with pharmaceutical 
companies, provide access to affordable essential drugs 
in developing countries 
8.13 Proportion of population with access to affordable 
essential drugs on a sustainable basis 
Target 8.F: In cooperation with the private sector, make 
available the benefits of new technologies, especially 
information and communications 
8.14 Fixed telephone lines per 100 inhabitants  
8.15 Mobile cellular subscriptions per 100 inhabitants 
8.16 Internet users per 100 inhabitants 
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